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Political Instability and Economic Growth at Different Stages of 
Economic Development: historical evidence from Greece 
Sotiris K. Papaioannou1 
 
ABSTRACT  
This study explores the relationship between political instability and growth within the 
perspective of Greece’s modern history. The narrative approach is used to identify major 
events of political unrest which took place in the period from 1833 onwards. Econometric 
estimates show that political instability exerts an adverse effect on economic growth. 
Likewise, poor economic performance increases the likelihood of political risk. Their 
relationship is not uniform across time but strengthens only after the second half of the 20th 
century.  The impact of political instability is conditional on the stage of economic 
development with the most harmful effect observed in the phase of rapid industrialization. 
When distinguishing between permanent and temporary effects of political instability, a 
strongly negative effect is observed on the growth rate of potential output and a weakly 
negative impact on the cyclical component of GDP. Political instability is unfavorably affected 
by the growth rate of potential output. 
 
JEL Numbers: N10, O43, O47 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that political instability affects growth is well documented in the economics’ 
literature (Alesina et al., 1996). Most of the existing empirical research explores the 
influence of political instability within a cross country setting and offers evidence in favor 
of a strongly negative effect on growth. Incidents of political violence such as civil wars, 
coups and mass demonstrations exert an adverse influence on economic activity. 
A variety of indicators have been proposed to model the influence of political instability. 
Composite indices encompassing information on the number of assassinations, protests 
and coups were created by Venieris and Gupta (1983; 1986) and Gupta (1990). Alesina 
et al. (1996) classified political instability in two distinct categories: the first emphasizes 
on the propensity of government change which can be constitutional or 
unconstitutional, while the second is related to events of political violence and social 
unrest. Alesina and Perotti (1996) measured sociopolitical instability only with indices 
that capture violent events including information on the number of politically motivated 
assassinations, the number of people killed in incidents of domestic mass violence, the 
number of successful and unsuccessful coups and on whether a country is democratic 
or not. Klomp and de Haan (2009) distinguished four areas of political instability. The 
first is called aggression and is correlated with guerrilla, revolutions and internal conflict. 
The second is called protest and relates to strikes, riots and anti-government 
demonstrations. The third is regime instability and is associated with coups, regime 
durability and constitutional changes while the fourth is called government instability 
and is correlated with polarization and political cohesion. Jong-A-Pin (2009) also 
identified four major areas of political instability. These are: politically motivated 
violence, mass civil protest, instability within the political regime and instability of the 
political regime.1  
Given that continuous time series indicators of political instability are scant, the existing 
research compares economic performance based on cross country observations. 
However, the time period under examination is usually short and does not allow us to 
distinguish whether the effects of political instability change over time. It also remains 
unclear to what extent political risk affects long run performance or impacts temporarily 
on short term fluctuations. Importantly, the impact of political risk on economic growth 
is heterogeneous and therefore the estimated slope coefficients of cross-country 
 
1 Other measures of political risk are derived from respondents’ perceptions on various dimensions of 
political stability (see the Business Environment Risk Intelligence or the International Country Risk Guide). 
However, these indicators are often viewed as subjective given that the respondents’ answers usually 
align with the economic conjecture. 
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studies should be interpreted as mean effects which could vary systematically between 
countries at different stages of economic development. 
Unlike most studies using cross country indices, I use historical data to create a unique 
time series indicator of political instability that extends over 183 years (1833-2016) to 
study its co-evolution with economic growth of a single country. The narrative approach 
is used to identify major events of political instability that took place in Greece’s modern 
history from 1833 onwards, soon after its liberation from the Ottoman Empire. The 
history of Greece is rich in episodes of political unrest which have been manifested in 
coups (successful or unsuccessful), civil war and mass revolutions that need to be 
captured in order to investigate their effects on economic performance. This definition 
of political instability (coups, civil war and mass demonstrations) is closest to the idea of 
Barro (1991) of using political risk as a measure for the protection of property rights. 
Appendix A1 narrates in detail all major events of economic, political and social 
instability that dominated Greece’s history after the liberation from the Ottoman Empire 
in 1830 (for a detailed coverage of all major events in the modern history of Greece see 
Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2009).2   
The use of time series data allows us to answer questions that have not been raised so 
far. First, I ask if political instability and economic growth are mutually determined. 
Though this issue has already been explored, the evidence provided so far is mixed (see 
Londregan and Poole, 1990; Alesina et al., 1996; Campos and Nugent, 2002) and the use 
of long time series data will help us uncover the nature of this relationship within a 
single-country setting.  
Second, while a theoretic and empirical link has been established between political 
instability and growth in cross country studies (see Table 1 for a brief review of the 
existing empirical research), little is known if this relationship holds at different stages 
of economic development. The deleterious effect of political instability is more likely to 
take place in industrialized countries at late stages of development. Investment 
spending in capital intensive sectors and countries raises the importance of political 
instability as a facilitator of the uninterrupted and efficient provision of property rights. 
By contrast, its damaging effect could not be decisive in underdeveloped agrarian 
economies as the importance of investment for growth is negligible for such countries. 
A major feature widely shared by less developed agrarian economies is the large share 
of the population that is living in villages and works in the home production sector. Self-
consumption of the household production is high, especially in rural areas, while the 
 
2 Despite its turbulent political life, the country managed to remarkably raise its living standards and move 
from the laggards of Europe to the club of the richest countries of the world. At the same time Greece 
became a liberal democracy with powerful institutions that protect citizens’ human rights. 
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potential home production surplus is exchanged through barter, rather than the market 
system. In this case, the existence of an efficient system of property rights is not crucial 
as a high proportion of daily exchanges takes place informally. The present paper is a 
first study that systematically tries to establish a convincing relationship between 
political instability and economic growth at different stages of economic development. 
Greece is a representative case of a medium-high income industrialized country that 
shared all features of an agrarian home production economy, soon after its liberation 
from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. 
Third, I ask if the effects of political instability on growth are temporary or last over the 
long run. While prior literature has documented a robust relationship between political 
instability and economic growth little is known about the mechanisms through which 
these effects take place. I therefore distinguish between permanent effects of political 
instability on potential output and temporary influences on cyclical gross domestic 
product (GDP). Last but not least, the effect of political instability on growth is evaluated 
against the influence of indicators that capture other shocks related to economic 
default, war and dictatorship.  
I test these hypotheses by estimating a structural two-equation econometric model in 
which the endogenous variables are output per capita growth and political instability. 
Three stage least squares econometric estimates verify the adverse effect of political 
instability on economic performance and point to a negative impact of growth on 
political unrest. This relationship is not uniform but changes over time. Political 
instability and growth were not significantly associated until the second half of the 20th 
century. The empirical analysis suggests that the effect of political instability is 
conditional on the level of economic development with the most harmful impact taking 
place at the stage of rapid industrialization of the Greek economy in the second half of 
the 20th century. To raise the reliability of the obtained estimates, I provide difference 
in differences econometric evidence which show that the harmful impact of the 
revolutionary events of 1848 was more pronounced in high income countries of 
continental Europe. Political unrest exerts a strongly negative effect on potential GDP 
growth and a weakly negative impact on cyclical output. Likewise, political instability is 
unfavorably affected by potential output growth.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the link between 
political instability and economic growth within the context of Greek history. Section 3 
describes the econometric specification. Section 4 presents the empirical results. In 
Section 5 I provide the conclusion. 
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2. Political instability and economic performance within the 
historical perspective of Greece 
Greece, soon after its liberation from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, became a recognized 
state under the name ‘Kingdom of Greece’. The new state included only a small part of 
its present territory, the regions of Peloponnese, Cyclades and a part of Central Greece. 
Greece's economy at that time was underdeveloped and heavily dependent on rural 
activities. The industrial sector of the Greek economy grew very slowly (Petmezas, 
2006). The reasons for this were mainly political instability, insecurity in the countryside, 
bad international relations with the main forces of Europe and the neighboring 
countries, international unreliability and lack of basic infrastructure.  The Kingdom of 
Greece was characterized by a large number of small farmers and a noteworthy equal 
distribution of land (Petmezas, 2003).  
Limited tax capacity, heavy regulation, lack of efficient provision of property rights, low 
participation in international trade and inefficient fiscal and monetary policies were the 
dominant features of economic policy. Hatzis (2019) notes that the nineteenth century 
was a period of a slow modernization of the country’s economic structure and 
institutions. During this period and up to 1922 the political priority of political forces was 
dominated by the irredentist idea of the enlargement of the Greek state to include all 
lands, under Ottoman rule, inhabited by large Greek-speaking populations. This entailed 
the build of a relatively large, yet inefficient, administration and an active policy of 
nationalist expansion that ultimately put an excessive burden upon the Greek economy 
and undermined its financial stability. Military competition promoted by the idea of 
enlargement could have an effect on the late modernization of the Greek economy. 
Petmezas (2006) notes that a large part of the foreign debt contracted at that time was 
directed to and uselessly spent in military oriented objectives. Changes in monetary and 
fiscal policy and sudden swifts in exchange rate regimes were frequent and caused by 
military needs (Lazaretou, 2014). The public finances of that period were very bad and 
there was always a need for external borrowing. It is noteworthy that by 1893 the newly 
formed Greek state had already been bankrupt three times.  
A minority of political parties argued that modernization of the Greek economy should 
first take place, however this policy did not become dominant until the end of the Asia 
Minor catastrophe in 1922. During the 19th and the first half of the 20th century Greece 
was a rural economy (with an agricultural share in GDP higher than 50%), dominated by 
undercapitalized small family farms, absence of technology, low productivity and 
exports of labour intensive products of arboriculture (Petmezas, 2006). One should add 
the poor transport and public infrastructure until the last two decades of the 19th 
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century. Most of this era is characterized by tumultuous political life and periods of 
authoritarian regimes. National wars, major disagreements between political groups, 
national schism between the elected government and the King, successful and 
unsuccessful coups and civil war are major events that contributed to prolonged political 
instability that lasted until the end of the civil war in 1949 (see Appendix Α1) and is 
largely responsible for the Greek states’ weakness to build an efficient institutional 
framework that protects investors’ rights.3  
Besley and Persson (2009) emphasize on the ability of the state to provide an effective 
mechanism that protects property stating that provision of this public good is not 
exogenously given but largely determined by the state’s capacity. This ability is in turn 
shaped by social and political conditions. Governments which operate in an unstable 
political environment lack the incentive to undertake actions that protect property 
rights as they fully internalize the political cost of the reform but not the benefits 
(Svenssson, 1998; Keefer and Knack, 2002). In addition, short horizons of governments 
make it more likely to prefer expropriation over growth and weaken political incentive 
to support growth enhancing economic policies.4,5 Likewise, countries with poor 
economic performance are prone to political unrest as they are often confronted with 
social discontent. Besley and Persson (2011) make the case that poor economic 
performance, political instability and weak enforcement of property rights are all 
symptoms of a fragile state. Politically unstable countries are unable to effectively 
provide high quality public goods that facilitate growth but at the same time, low income 
countries and ineffective states are more likely to incubate incidents of political 
violence.  
Only after WWW II and the subsequent civil war, Greece’s economy finally entered the 
stage of rapid industrialization. The economic structure was transformed with the 
decisive decline of the share of agriculture (Petmezas, 2006). Alogoskoufis et al. (1995) 
 
3 Sources of political instability might be ideological, political, social, economic, ethno-linguistic or 
religious. They manifest themselves when groups of organized people face financial hardship or do not 
find representation within the existing institutional setting.  
4 Under political unrest, the protection of property rights lacks intertemporal reliability and distorts 
incentives to engage in long term productive investments (Fielding 2003). On the contrary, in periods of 
political stability, the risk is lower and firms face an undisturbed time-horizon that allows them to 
undertake costly investments. Collier (1999) argues that political instability and the threat of civil war 
affect the composition of physical capital formation and lower investment in non-traded capital goods. As 
physical capital formation is partly irreversible, rational behavior calls for withholding investment until 
much of the uncertainty disappears. Political stability also impacts on growth through the channel of trade 
as it enables an asset’s mobility. It also increases financial transactions by raising the possibility of using 
an asset as collateral. 
5 Formal links between political instability and economic outcomes can be found in Svensson (1998) and 
Devereux and Wen (1998). 
 9 
 
argue that after the end of the civil war in 1949 the political regime was characterized 
by commitment and coordination mechanisms that led to high investment and growth 
by guaranteeing property rights in the constitution and the law. This period is 
characterized by a relatively higher degree of political instability which helped to 
facilitate a climate of business trust. Greece enjoyed one of the strongest, almost 
uninterrupted growth rates on a global level with rapid industrialization rates (Hatzis, 
2019). Partial liberalization of the economy and integration to the globalized economic 
system led Greece to a middle-income status. 
However, this era is not completely free of episodes of political unrest. The period 1965-
66 is characterized by prolonged political instability which had been triggered by a major 
disagreement between the prime minister and the king of Greece. During July of 1965 
large mass demonstrations took place in the center of Athens against monarch. This 
period of political instability weakened the ability of the Greek political system to govern 
the country and finally led to the imposition of a seven-year military dictatorship during 
1967-1974. The period from 1974 onwards is characterized by the complete and 
uninterrupted restoration of democracy and political rights. At the same time, however, 
a period of political violence started with the advent of the terrorist organization of ‘17th 
November’. Its actions included bombings, arms’ seizures robberies and politically 
motivated assassinations that caused death of twenty three people, among them Greek 
and foreign politicians, diplomats, military, police officers, businessmen and citizens. 
Soon after the outbreak of the economic crisis, during December of 2008, large mass 
demonstrations burst in the center of Athens after killing of a 15-year old student by an 
armed police officer. Shortly after, a prolonged period of mass demonstrations took 
place during 2010-12 against inclusion of the country to the economic adjustment 
programmes and supervision by the Troika (International Monetary Fund, European 
Commission, European Central Bank). 
 
3. Econometric specification 
3.1 Model and explanatory variables 
In order to investigate the effect of political instability on growth, I use a time series 
dataset that extends over the period 1833-2016. I first provide a short discussion of the 
single equation approach. Though its major drawback is that it does not take into 
consideration the reverse association between growth and instability, I use it primarily 
to facilitate comparison with the simultaneous equation methodology which is later 
employed to address the issue of endogeneity bias. The following growth specification 
is considered:  
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐷𝑡−1+𝑢𝑡  (1) 
with Y being the growth rate of output per capita and X a vector of regressors lagged by 
one period. Data for the variable of real GDP per capita growth are provided from the 
Maddison Project Database and are expressed in 2011 international dollars. The 
Maddison Project Database is amongst the most widely used sources of historical 
income data providing information on real GDP growth over the very long run. Pre-1950 
real GDP data are usually based on benchmark estimates derived either from historical 
national accounts or from historical studies. For more details on the construction of the 
real GDP per capita series see Bolt et al. (2018). 
INS is a dummy variable associated with political instability. One kind is related to 
executive or government uncertainty and usually involves regular or irregular 
government changes, frequent elections, ministerial changes etc. Another category 
entails more radical incidents (coups, civil war and mass demonstrations), is related to 
regime instability and emphasizes on phenomena of social unrest. This definition is 
closest to my idea of political instability as it often involves substantial changes in the 
protection of property rights, retreat of the rule of law and violent reversion of the 
existing economic legislation which are more likely to exert a lasting influence on long 
term economic growth.  
I treat political instability as the probability of a political change that does not 
take place through the usual channel of elections and I follow the narrative approach to 
identify all major events of political turmoil in Greece. Then a dummy variable is created 
which receives ones for the years during which incidents of successful or unsuccessful 
coups d’état, mass revolutions and civil war took place and zero otherwise. Other 
incidents of political violence such as strikes, riots or political assassinations are not 
included as many of them are misreported or not reported. Table 2 summarizes all 
identified incidents of political instability along with current, previous and next year’s 
GDP growth rates. Most events were accompanied by a subsequent fall in the rate of 
GDP per capita growth, compared to previous or current period’s economic growth. 
However, we observe that during the period of the civil war (1946-1949) and especially 
during 1946-47, Greece witnessed remarkable growth rates. This can be explained by 
convergence dynamics, as the economy started to grow from a low income level and 
after a five year- period of significant income losses (average GDP growth was equal to 
-17.2% during the period of WWW II, 1940-45). 
A drawback of using a single dummy variable is that it is difficult to interpret its 
influence unambiguously given that other events that take place within the same period 
could exert an independent impact on economic performance. Therefore, I consider 
vector D which includes dummy variables associated with other major events against 
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which the impact of political instability is gauged. These events are war, dictatorship and 
economic default. The first distinguishes all years during which Greece was involved in 
a war. The second is associated with economic instability and receives one for the year 
of the global economic crash (1929) and for all years during which the Greek government 
declared default. Finally, I employ a dummy variable which receives ones for the periods 
during which Greece was ruled by a dictatorship. 
I also consider government uncertainty which is related to regular government 
changes. In doing so, I create a dummy variable which dates all years during which 
parliamentary elections took place. Political uncertainty regarding re-election might be 
harmful for growth. In periods before the elections politicians engage in myopic 
behavior and are not interested in long term policies. Governments usually postpone 
unpopular decisions and avoid bearing the political cost. Examples of this kind of 
behavior are the delay of structural reforms or excess public spending. 
My choice of variables included in vector X is guided by economic theory. I 
therefore include the once lagged variable of output per capita to control for 
convergence effects. As I estimate a time series econometric specification, I include a 
time trend in the regression and also consider the lagged growth rate of output per 
capita to account for persistence in the dependent variable. In the absence of any 
reported data on physical capital formation, I include in the specification the variable of 
bank savings (% GDP) to model the influence of private investment.6 I also consider the 
growth rate of the population (Maddison Project Database, Bolt et al., 2018) to control 
for the influence of major territorial expansions that took place in the period between 
1833 and 1922. Given that the Great Britain was significantly linked to the Greek 
economy and was a dominant economic nation for much of the period under 
investigation I include the growth rate of English GDP to account for the impact of 
growth spillovers. I also consider the influence of macroeconomic instability and public 
finances and include in my specification the variables of inflation and public debt (% of 
GDP).7 The econometric specification also includes the impact of political institutions 
 
6 The time coverage of this variable ranges between 1842 and 1939 and between 1960 and 2015. No 
observations are available for the period of war between 1940 and 1949 (WWWII and civil war). Bank 
deposits between 1950 and 1960 do not enter in this variable as observations of this period are not 
compatible with the rest of the time series. Observations for bank deposits between 1842 and 1939 are 
from Lazaretou (2014). From 1960 onwards I use the ratio of bank deposits to GDP (Worldbank, 2017). 
7 For the 1834-1938 period inflation is approximated by the growth rate of the GDP deflator which is based 
on a composite price index comprising of ten major products from agriculture, livestock, forestry and 
mining (Kostelenos et al., 2007). For the period from 1949 onwards this variable is the yearly change of 
the consumer price index. The consumer price index for the period 1949-1959 has been obtained from 
the Bank of Greece (1992). From 1960 onwards I use the yearly price change of the consumer price index 
of ELSTAT (2018). The debt to GDP variable is from IMF’s (2015) historical debt to GDP database and is 
available for the period 1884-2015. Missing observations are from periods 1914-1927, 1940-1951, 1957, 
1976-1978. 
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and therefore I include the Polity IV index of democracy which measures the degree of 
political freedom in a country (Marshall et al., 2018). It contains information on the 
extent of democracy and ranges from strongly autocratic (-10) to strongly democratic 
(10). Its impact on growth is still ambiguous with Gerring et al. (2005) stating that its 
growth effect is null of negative. Recently, Acemoglu et al. (2019) have challenged this 
view by showing that democracy causes growth across a wide panel of countries. In the 
absence of any officially reported data on the educational level of the population, an 
obvious disadvantage of the econometric specification is the lack of any control variable 
related to the stock of human capital.   
I also consider the following probit model: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡  (2) 
INS is a dummy variable that models political instability and receives ones in the 
occurrence of a coup, mass demonstration and civil war. ECON is a set of economic 
variables that determine political instability. I consider the influence of the level and the 
growth rate of GDP per capita. I also control for the effect of macroeconomic instability 
and include the variable of inflation. POL is the Polity IV index of democracy which is 
expected to exert an adverse influence on political instability. Democratic regimes tend 
to experience less instability than undemocratic regimes because they allow people to 
participate in the political process. By allowing participation, internal conflicts are 
resolved through the process of voting. In undemocratic regimes, social discontent does 
not find representation through the elections and therefore is more likely to take place 
through violent events. D is a vector which encompasses four dummy variables 
associated with the incidence of war, dictatorship, default and elections.  
Table 3 provides brief descriptive statistics and of all variables that are used in the 
econometric analysis. It also provides frequencies of dummy variables that enter in the 
regressions. We should note that specific economic variables receive extreme values in 
certain historical periods. For instance, the minimum value of GDP per capita growth 
was -51.36% in 1913 which was the second year of the Balkan wars. Its maximum value 
was 52.21% in 1918 which coincides with the end of the WWW I. Similarly, the lowest 
value of the inflation rate (-99.88%) was observed in 1954, one year after the drastic 
devaluation of the national currency, while its maximum value (72.57%) was observed 
in 1923, when Greece received in its territory more than one million refugees from Asia 
Minor. The debt to GDP variable came close or even exceeded 200% in the decade after 
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the default of 1893.8 For robustness purposes the empirical analysis that follows will skip 
outlier observations (Table 7). The correlation matrix of Table 4 illustrates that no 
significant problem of multicollinearity exists between explanatory variables that enter 
as regressors in Equations 1 and 2.   
 
3.2 Identification 
If the residuals of equations (1) and (2) are not correlated, then OLS estimates will 
deliver consistent estimates. This assumption is rather unrealistic given that the error 
term of the growth equation is plausibly associated with political instability. Besides, a 
significant correlation with growth does not necessarily imply a causal effect. Poor 
economic performance increases the probability of a major political event or a 
government change after increased public discontent. In modern democracies, such a 
change manifests itself through the election of a new government. However, in 
turbulent periods or in countries which are politically and institutionally 
underdeveloped, political instability may be manifested through violent events such as 
coups, demonstrations or even civil war. Gupta (1990), Londregran and Poole (1990) and 
Alesina et al. (1996) argued that poor growth performance could be the source of 
political instability.  
In this case, the estimation of a structural econometric specification is the modeling 
choice that should be followed (Alesina and Peroti, 1996). I consider the following 
system of two equations: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑎1 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛾1𝑋11 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑁𝑆 + 𝑒𝑡  (3) 
𝐼𝑁𝑆 = 𝑎2 + 𝛽𝑋2 + 𝛾2𝑋22 + 𝛿2𝑌 + 𝑢𝑡  (4) 
The dependent variable of equation (3) is the growth rate of output per capita Y. In 
equation (4) the dependent variable is political instability INS. X11 is a vector of variables 
that determine economic growth (Y). It includes lagged GDP per capita (in log) and 
lagged GDP per capita growth, political instability, the dummy variables of war, default, 
elections and dictatorship and the economic variables of inflation, debt (% of GDP) and 
deposits (% of GDP). X22 is a set of variables that determine political instability. It includes 
GDP per capita (in log) and GDP per capita growth, lagged political instability, inflation 
and the dummy variables of war, default, elections and dictatorship 
 
8 Figures A1 to A3 in the Appendix demonstrate the time evolution of the variables of GDP per capita 
growth, inflation and debt to GDP. 
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One important issue in estimating the above empirical model is the correct identification 
of the two equations. One or more of the regressors in one of the two equations must 
not enter as independent variable in the remaining equation. This means that at least 
one of the regressors in equation (3) affects only GDP per capita growth. Similarly, one 
of the regressors in equation (4) should affect only political instability. Therefore, vector 
X1 includes the growth rate of English GDP and the trend of time as exogenous covariates 
that affect only growth while X2 encompasses the polity IV index of democracy as an 
exogenous variable that identifies political instability. Coefficients δ1 and δ2 estimate the 
causal effect between growth and political instability. The estimation is carried out via 
the three-stage least squares econometric methodology to account for correlation in 
the disturbances of equations (3-4). 
 
4. Econometric estimates 
4.1 Stationarity 
Given the long-time length of the dataset, the examination of time series properties of 
the main variables of interest is necessary. I perform unit root tests for the economic 
variables of output per capita, inflation and debt to GDP by using the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. 
I first test if the variables are stationary in the logarithmic levels. The null hypothesis of 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test is that the variable under examination is non-
stationary. Unit root tests of Table 5 indicate that the variables of GDP per capita, 
inflation and debt to GDP are non-stationary in their logarithmic levels, as their 
associated tests are lower than their 5% critical values. When considering the first 
differences of variables, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected suggesting 
that output per capita, inflation and debt to GDP are stationary in their first differences. 
4.2 Initial estimates 
Initial OLS econometric estimates of equation (1) are based on time series observations 
ranging from 1833 to 2016 (Table 6). All estimates of columns 1-4 point to a negative 
and statistically significant impact of political instability on economic growth which 
ranges from -0.044 to -0.062. The long run effect of political instability is measured by 
its coefficient estimate divided by (1-α) where α is the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable. Relying on estimates of column 1, this is equal to -0.054 / (1+0.399) 
= -0.038. 
Concerning the rest of covariates included in Table 6, lagged GDP per capita enters the 
regression with a significantly negative coefficient estimate confirming that economic 
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growth of Greece has followed a successful convergence process. The coefficient of the 
time trend variable is significantly positive, suggesting that Greece’s economic 
performance improves over time. Likewise, spillover effects as approximated by the 
growth rate of English GDP, exert a favorable impact on growth of the Greek economy. 
We also observe a weakly positive impact of the dummy variable of dictatorship on GDP 
per capita growth in half of the regressions reported in Table 6. However, after a careful 
inspection of income growth rates throughout the whole period under examination, we 
verify that the impact of dictatorship on economic growth is negligible as average GDP 
per capita growth during dictatorships was 1.34% while in the rest of the period was 
equal to 1.36%. Durbin Watson values are close to 2 across all reported regressions 
ensuring that the residuals are not autocorrelated. 
In Table 7 I report some additional robustness checks. First, I re-estimate equation (1) 
by skipping outlier observations with a standardized residual higher than 1.96 or lower 
than -1.96 (column 1). I also check the sensitivity of estimates to the set of covariates 
included in the analysis. Including a fairly large set of explanatory variables limits 
degrees of freedom whereas coefficients could be unstable in the presence of co-
linearity. For this reason, I choose to exclude from the analysis some controls which 
could be side effects of political instability, such as the occurrence of war, dictatorship, 
economic crisis, elections (column 2). Results of columns 1-2 illustrate that the impact 
of political instability remains strongly negative. Its coefficient estimate rises 
considerably when excluding from the regression the occurrence of other shocks related 
to war, dictatorship, economic crisis and elections (column 2). Finally, to assess if the 
dynamic specification can affect the interpretation of the results, I transform equation 
(1) to an error correction model. As can be seen by the results of column 3 the qualitative 
and quantitative effect of political instability is essentially the same to those obtained 
by estimates of Table 6. The error correction term is negative and close to -1 indicating 
that any short run disequilibrium is fully dissipated before by the next time period.  
Table 8 reports probit econometric estimates of Equation 2. I first consider a set of 
baseline regressors that model the effect of GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth and 
democracy on political instability (column 1). Then I include an extended array of shocks 
that could trigger events of political instability (column 2). Such incidents include the 
occurrence of default, war, elections and dictatorship.  I also consider the variable of 
inflation to control for the impact of macroeconomic imbalances. Overall, coefficient 
estimates of the variable of GDP per capita growth lack statistical significance. The once 
lagged variable of GDP per capita enters the regression with a significantly positive 
coefficient estimate only in estimates of column 2. The polity IV index of democracy is 
negatively associated with the dependent variable signifying that democratic 
institutions could lower the risk of political instability. Similarly, previous year’s political 
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instability and the incidence of a war are positively associated with the likelihood of 
political instability (column 2).  
 
4.3 Simultaneous equation estimates 
To identify the causal effect of political instability on economic growth and vice-versa, I 
proceed with the estimation of a structural econometric model that considers the 
possibility of their endogenous association. Table 9 provides generalized least squares 
estimates of the system of equations 3 and 4. The dependent variable of equation 3 is 
the growth rate of GDP per capita with political instability entering as an explanatory 
covariate. In Equation 4, the dummy variable capturing incidents of political instability 
is the dependent variable with the growth rate of GDP per capita entering as a regressor. 
As identifying variables in equation 3 I consider the growth rate of English GDP and the 
trend of time as both of them were found to exert a significant influence on the variable 
of economic growth (Tables 6-7). Likewise, the polity index of democracy is the 
identifying variable in equation 4 as estimates of Table 8 point to a negative association 
with the likelihood of political unrest. Given a legacy of empirical results showing that 
the income effect of democratic political institutions is weak (Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Persson and Tabellini, 2009), the polity index of democracy is not included as regressor 
in equation 3. 
Estimates of Table 9 (column 1-3) confirm that political instability exerts a significantly 
negative effect on growth. Its estimated influence is higher in magnitude compared to 
initial OLS estimates. Similarly, estimates of the bottom part of Table 9 demonstrate that 
poor growth performance increases the probability of political instability. Estimates of 
column 2 consider the growth influence of private deposits whose estimated influence 
on economic activity is not statistically significant. In column 3, I include a restricted set 
of controls to model the association between economic growth and political instability. 
All estimates point to a negative effect of GDP per capita growth and establish a mutually 
negative feedback relationship with political instability. We also notice that war is 
negatively correlated with political instability and exerts a reasonably negative influence 
on economic growth. 
This evidence is in line with Asteriou and Siriopoulos (2000) showing that socio-political 
instability, as measured by a composite index comprising of politically motivated 
assassinations, terrorist activities, strikes, elections and the extent of democracy, 
exerted a negative impact on stock market performance and economic growth of Greece 
during 1960-95. Along the same lines, Asteriou and Price (2001) created a composite 
index comprising of terrorist events, strikes, elections government changes and war to 
show that political instability affected negatively economic growth and positively growth 
uncertainty of the UK during 1961-97. 
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Next, I follow the approach of Asteriou and Siriopoulos (2000) to create an index that 
comprises of various components of socio-political instability. In doing so, I use principal 
component analysis to combine the dummy variables of political instability, war, default, 
elections and dictatorship into a single index is time variant. A drawback of this approach 
is that this composite index does not include components such as terrorism activities 
and strikes due to the very long time series of this study. Estimates of column 4 confirm 
the mutually negative inter-relationship between the composite index of socio-political 
instability and economic growth. Importantly, the polity IV index of democracy exerts a 
strongly negative effect on instability signifying the role of the democratic constitution 
in mitigating phenomena of political unrest. 
In column 5, I re-estimate equations 3-4 by assuming that the growth rate of 
England was determining economic growth of Greece over a shorter time period. Given 
that Britain’s economic dominance declined significantly from WWW II onwards, I create 
a multiplicative term between the growth rate of England and a dummy variable that 
receives ones during 1833-1940 and zero otherwise. Econometric estimates do not 
change drastically when this multiplicative term enters the regression instead of the 
initial variable of English GDP per capita growth (column 5). 
 
4.4 Structural breaks and the role of the stage of development 
Given the long time period under investigation, the effect of political instability on 
growth could drastically change at a point in time. A Wald test based on the regression 
of GDP per capita growth on a time trend shows that in the year of 1955 a structural 
break took place (Table 10). Also, Figure 1 illustrates a CUSUSM parameter stability test 
based on the squared recursive residuals of the growth regression of Table 9. Parameter 
instability is statistically established when the weighted cumulative recursive residuals 
stray outside their confidence intervals. This is exactly what Figure 1 illustrates for a sub-
period that starts in the middle of the sample.  
With this in mind, I proceed with the estimation of equations (3-4) across two different 
sub-periods. I use 1955 as my threshold point and perform regressions before and after 
this year. Estimates of Table 11 suggest that the nature of the relationship between 
political instability and growth is not uniform over time. As illustrated by estimates of 
column 1 political instability did not exert any significant influence on growth in the 
period before 1955. By contrast, in the post-1955 period, political stability emerges as a 
key factor in boosting economic growth.9  We also confirm that GDP per capita growth 
caused a negative effect on political instability in the post-1955 period. Concerning the 
 
9 In the absence of any events of war or default, their impact is not reported in estimates of the post-1955 
period.   
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rest of covariates included in Table 11, inflation exerts a negative effect on growth in the 
post-1955 period, while lagged GDP per capita and war affected economic growth in a 
negative way during 1833-1955. 
One possible explanation for the uneven effect of political instability relates to the 
multiple stages of development that the Greek economy has gone through the last 200 
years. Throughout the whole 19th and during the first half of the 20th century, Greece 
was characterized by the undercapitalized structure of its production. If political 
instability matters more for countries which are capital intensive, then we should expect 
that rural-labor intensive economies should be less vulnerable by incidents of political 
disorder. Likewise, the period after the first half of the 20th century coincides with the 
rapid take-off and industrialization of the Greek economy. A successful transition of the 
Greek economy to a high growth regime required an environment free of political risks 
that would ensure the uninterrupted undertaking of private investments. 
I test this possibility by performing regressions at different stages of economic 
development as measured by a) the economic gap of Greece vis-a-vis the Great Britain 
which was the dominant nation for much of the period under investigation and b) by the 
percent of population living in rural areas. The economic gap is measured by the distance 
(relative ratio) of GDP per capita between the two countries. As regards the percent of 
rural population, I use yearly estimates of the share of population living in areas with 
population lower than 2.000 (Dertilis 1993). These observations range from 1833 to 
1933. I preferred to use this measure since population statistics are available on a yearly 
basis already from 1828 (while occupational statistics are not) allowing us to avoid 
extrapolation back to 1833. This series is complemented with official census statistics of 
the percent of rural population that is available on a ten-year basis from 1920 onwards 
(ELSTAT, 2020). Missing observations have been recovered with the use of interpolation 
techniques. Table 12 shows the evolution of the development stage of the Greek 
economy as measured by its economic gap vis-a-vis the Great Britain and by the share 
of its rural population. 
Estimates of Table 13 report the effect of political instability conditional on the 
economic gap vis-à-vis the Great Britain. Regressions are performed across different 
quartiles of its distribution with the economic gap itself also included interchangeably 
as an explanatory variable. The strongest effect of political instability is observed across 
quartiles with the lowest economic distance vis-à-vis the Great Britain. Likewise, 
estimates of Table 14 illustrate that the most harmful effect takes places at the quartiles 
with the lowest share of rural population fitting our theoretical priors that the effect of 
political instability is stronger at late stages of economic development.  
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4.5 The effect of political instability in high income European countries 
Estimates of Tables 13-14 are informative for the presence of a non-linear relationship 
between political instability and growth which is conditional on the stage of economic 
development. However, OLS estimates usually suffer from serious endogeneity bias and 
therefore cannot be used to establish causality.  
To validate the causal nature of the effect of political instability on growth and add 
generality on its conditional influence on the level of economic development, I follow a 
counterfactual approach to compare its effects within a sample of twelve European 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and UK). I use the table of revolutionary events of Aidt 
and Jensen (2014) and consider the revolutions of 1848 as an exogenous event that 
could have an impact on economic growth. Aidt and Jensen (2014) identify Austria, 
France, Germany and Italy as the countries that were more heavily influenced by the 
revolutions of that time. I therefore use them as my treatment group to see if the effect 
of revolutions was more severe against that of the remaining eight countries that form 
the control group.  
I ask the following two questions: (i) what would be the rate of economic growth of 
European countries had they not been affected by the revolutionary events of 1848? 
and (ii) was GDP per capita growth more influenced in countries that were more 
wealthy?  My sample extends over the period 1838-1859. I compare growth 
performance between treated and control countries before and after 1848 with the 
following difference in differences specification: 
 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝜃𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐼(𝑡 > 𝑠) + 𝛿𝑄𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼(𝑡 > 𝑠) + 𝛽𝛸 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (5) 
growth is the outcome variable of GDP per capita growth, while i indexes countries at 
time t. 𝑄𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable receiving ones for countries that were influenced from 
the revolutions of 1848 (Austria, France, Germany and Italy) and zero otherwise, 
𝐼(𝑡 > 𝑠) is an indicator function equal to one for the post-1848 period (1848-1859) and 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼(𝑡 > 𝑠) is an interaction term between 𝑄𝑖𝑡  and 𝐼(𝑡 > 𝑠). The parameter 𝛿 
represents the effect of revolutionary events on growth which is estimated by the 
difference in differences estimator. Vector Χ includes as explanatory covariates those of 
the logarithm of GDP per capita (log), population growth (both obtained from the 
Maddison Project Database), the polity IV index of democracy and the inflation rate 
(Reinhart et al., 2018). Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term.  
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Difference in differences comparisons of economic growth are presented in Table 15, 
along with the associated standard errors. The upper panel shows that the average 
growth difference between control and treated countries was statistically insignificant 
before the revolutions of 1848 (column 1). The lower panel illustrates that growth 
differences in the post-revolutionary period were negative and statistically significant 
indicating that economic performance of countries that were affected by revolutions 
witnessed a significant drop. The overall effect of revolutions on growth is estimated by 
the difference in differences estimate which is significantly negative suggesting that 
economic growth would have been higher had European countries not been affected by 
the revolutionary events of 1848. Relying on estimates of column 1, GDP per capita 
growth would have been higher by 7.9% in the absence of revolutions. Difference in 
differences estimates of column 2 remain practically unchanged when considering in the 
regression two additional dummy variables that indicate the occurrence of a war (Aidt 
and Jensen, 2014) or the event of a severe economic crisis (Reinhart et al. 2018).  
To reduce the risk of selection bias, I use propensity score matching on a number of 
economic, social and political characteristics that are likely to predict the occurrence of 
a revolution. The goal is to approximate randomization of treatment by estimating the 
probability of the revolutions of 1848 given a vector of structural factors that could 
determine their occurrence. I use as predicting variables GDP per capita (log), inflation, 
population growth and democracy. Difference in differences comparisons between 
treated and control countries remain negative but lose their significance (column 3) 
suggesting that the growth effect of revolution is uncertain and could be shaped by 
structural characteristics.  
To see if the growth influence of revolutions was conditional on the level of economic 
development, I compare the economic performance of the most rich countries that 
were affected by revolutions against that of the rest ones. According to the Historical 
Statistics of the World Economy, GDP per capita in 1820 was higher in Austria and France 
(compared to that of Germany and Italy) and therefore these two countries form my 
second treatment group that is used to investigate if the stage of economic 
development matters for the growth influence of political instability. Regressions of 
columns 4-6 are performed in the same way as those in columns 1-3 and suggest that 
the economic activity of more developed countries was more severely hit by the 
revolutions of 1848.  
 
4.6 Permanent and temporary effects 
One of the goals of this study is to see if the effects of political instability on growth are 
temporary or last over the long run. The productivity impact of investments in physical 
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capital and technology equipment takes time to materialize and therefore potential 
output and aggregate supply should be adversely influenced in politically unstable 
countries that cannot effectively protect property rights. Likewise, cyclical output could 
be heavily influenced by precautionary saving, lower current consumption and a 
possible downturn in trade and exports in highly unstable countries. To distinguish 
between temporary effects on output fluctuations and permanent influences on 
potential GDP, we must first isolate the cyclical component from the estimated trend of 
GDP per capita. The economics’ literature proposes a variety of methods to separate 
long-term trends from cyclical fluctuations. I use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to 
detrend the GDP per capita series with a smoothing parameter λ=100 for annual data. 
The HP filter is not without criticism; however, its simple estimation and implementation 
makes it still widely acceptable in the business cycle literature. The estimated trend can 
be interpreted as the potential output and the cyclical component as the output gap.  
Table 16 reports coefficient estimates of political instability with trend GDP per capita 
growth (column 1) and output gap (column 2) entering as dependent variables.  
Consistent with its influence on labor supply, population growth enters as an 
explanatory variable in estimates of column 1. Regression results confirm that political 
instability affects growth of potential output in an unfavorable way. Similarly, the 
likelihood of political instability lowers as the growth rate of trend GDP per capita 
increases.  Estimates of column 2 are in favor of a weakly negative effect of instability 
on the cyclical component of GDP.  Output fluctuations do not exert any significant 
influence on the likelihood of political instability. Estimates of table 16 are in line with 
Campos et al. (2012) showing that informal political instability (as measured by 
politically motivated assassinations, guerilla warfare and strikes) exerted a negative long 
run and short run effect of growth of Argentina during 1896-2000. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between economic growth 
and political instability. Unlike the existing literature providing so far evidence based on 
cross country data, I studied their association within the historical context of Greece’s 
modern political life. The period after its liberation from the Ottoman Empire is rich in 
episodes of political violence and therefore their study could be useful in trying to 
explain the impact of political instability on economic performance of a single country.  
I followed the narrative approach to incorporate within a unique time series indicator 
all major events of political instability that took place from 1833 onwards. Compared to 
previous findings, this paper provides evidence in favor of a negative impact of political 
instability on economic growth. Likewise, poor growth performance raises the likelihood 
of political instability. Their relationship is not uniform across time. A significantly 
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negative interrelationship emerges only in the second half of the 20th century. The 
econometric estimates suggest that the growth influence of political instability is 
determined by the stage of economic development. The most harmful effect takes place 
in the phase of rapid industrialization. This study also shows that political instability 
mainly impacts on the growth rate of potential output. A weakly negative effect is also 
exerted on the cyclical component of GDP. Likewise, higher potential GDP growth exerts 
a strongly negative effect on the likelihood of political instability.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A1: Incidents of economic, political and social instability in Greece’s modern 
history 
1831: Rebellion of the Greek Navy, armed movement of organized groups against the 
government and assassination of the first governor of Greece Ioannis Kapodistrias. 1843: 
Insurgency against the first king of Greece Otto in 1843 which led to the grant of the first 
constitution. In the same year, the first default after the establishment of the Greek 
state took place which led to the imposition of fiscal control. 
1862: Eviction of the first King Otto after military uprising which led to his replacement 
by King George A’ in 1864. 
1893: Debt default of the Greek state.   
1897: Military defeat after the Greco-Turkish War which led to the imposition of 
international control over the Greek finances and subsequent fiscal consolidation. 
1909: Military coup against the government which resulted in the advent of the new 
Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos. 
1912-13: Participation of Greece in the Balkan Wars which led to a considerable 
territorial and population enlargement.  
1916: Major disagreement between the Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and King 
Constantine I over the military involvement of Greece in the WWW I led to a significant 
conflict and a national schism. In 1916 with the support of the French army, Venizelos 
set up a provisional government in Thessaloniki against the royalist government in 
Athens. There was also an armed confrontation in the streets of Athens between the 
royal army and the French forces. A naval blockade by the allies of Entante finally forced 
King Constantine I to leave Athens (without abdication) in 1917 and leave his son 
Alexander as king of Greece. Greece entered the war by the side of the Entrant allies in 
1917-18. 
1920-1922: In reward for the military support during WWW I the allies offered Greece 
the territories of Western and Eastern Thrace by the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. The Greek 
army also landed in the territory of western Asia Minor with the objective to annex it to 
Greece after a referendum. However, King Constantine and the royal friendly 
government of that period which took office after the elections of 1920 attempted to 
invade in the inside of the ex Ottoman Empire resulting finally in a major military defeat 
and a pogrom against the Greek population in 1922. After the catastrophe a military 
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coup which was organized by antiroyalist army officers took place and forced King 
Constantine I to abdicate.  
1923-1938: During this period a number of successful or unsuccessful military coups 
took place being the result of the political dispute between the liberal and the royalist 
party. We report the following: 1923: unsuccessful military coup against the 
government, 1925: successful military coup which led to the dictatorship by General 
Pagkalos lasting until 1926, 1926: Military coup against the dictator Pagkalos which led 
to his overthrow, 1933: unsuccessful military coup against the government, 1935: 
unsuccessful military coup against the government, 1936: Imposition of dictatorship 
under General Ioannis Metaxas, 1938: unsuccessful military coup against the 
government. 
1932: The Greek government declared default as a consequence of the global economic 
crash of 1929. 
1940-44: Greek-Italian war, invasion and occupation by German troops. During this 
period, the monetary and real sectors of the Greek economy collapsed. 
1944: Soon after liberation by the German troops, mass demonstration of the 
communist party took place against the coalition government and the British forces 
leading to an armed conflict in the area of Athens in December of 1944. Political 
polarization of that period and mass persecutions of the communists led to the civil war 
of 1946-49 after the decision of the communist party to abstain from the first post 
WWWII national elections in1946 and the return of King George. 
1951: military rebellion of a group of higher military officers in favor of the General of 
the Army Alexandros Papagos. 
1953: Drastic devaluation of the national currency. 
1965-66: Prolonged political instability after major disagreement of the prime minister 
with the king of Greece. During July of 1965 large mass demonstrations took place in the 
center of Athens against monarch. This period of political instability weakened the 
ability of the Greek political system to govern the country and finally led to the 
imposition of dictatorship after a military coup in 1967. 
1967: Successful military coup after a period of political turmoil (1965-1967) which led 
to the dictatorship of 1967-1974. 
1973: Military coup after the student uprisings of November 1973.  
2008: Large mass demonstrations during December of 2008 in the center of Athens after 
killing of a 15-year old student by a police officer.  
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2010-12: Prolonged period of mass demonstrations against inclusion of the country to 
the economic adjustment programmes and supervision by the Troika (International 
Monetary Fund, European Commission, European Central Bank). 
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Appendix A2: Evolution of GDP per capita growth, inflation and debt (% of GDP) 
 
Figure A1: GDP per capita growth (%, 1834-2016) 
 
 
Figure A2: Inflation (%, 1834-2016) 
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Figure A3: Debt to GDP (%, 1884-2016) 
 
Tables & Figures 
Table 1: Brief review of the empirical literature 
Study Finding Sample 
Stewart and Venieris 
(1985)  
Sociopolitical instability 
impacts on growth through the 
channel of lower savings. 
60 less developed 
countries during 1961-
67 
Venieris and Gupta (1986)  
 
Negative impact of unequal 
income distribution and 
sociopolitical instability on 
savings. 
49 non-communist 
countries at various 
years 
Londregran and Poole 
(1990)  
 
The likelihood of a government 
collapse increases with lower 
economic prosperity. No 
evidence in favor of a negative 
impact of coups on income 
growth.     
121 countries during 
1950-82 
Ozler and Rodrik (1992)  The extent of political stability 
can magnify or dampen the 
influence of an external shock 
on private investment.  
32 countries during 
1975-85 
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Fosu (1992)  
 
Political unrest is associated 
with inferior economic 
performance.   
38 Sub-Saharan 
countries during 1975-
90 
Alesina et al. (1996)  
 
Increased probability of 
government collapse impacts 
negatively on economic 
growth. Low economic 
performance increases the 
propensity of government 
change.  
113 countries for the 
period 1950 through 
1982 
Alesina and Perotti (1996)  
 
Income inequality increases 
the likelihood of sociopolitical 
instability which impacts 
negatively on investment. 
71 developed and 
developing countries 
during 1960–85 
Chen and Feng (1996)  
 
Regime instability, polarization 
and government repression 
exert a negative impact on 
growth.  
88 countries over the 
period 1974–90 
Ades and Chua (1997)  
 
Political instability of 
neighboring countries lowers 
economic growth through 
decreased trade flows and 
higher military spending. 
118 countries over the 
period 1960-85 
Gyimah-Brempong and 
Camacho (1998)  
 
Political unrest exerts an 
adverse effect on growth 
through lower human capital 
accumulation. 
18 Latin American 
countries over the 
period 1970-81 
Asteriou and Siriopoulos 
(2000) 
Socio-political instability as 
measured by a composite 
index comprised of politically 
motivated assassinations, 
terrorist activities, strikes, 
elections and the extent of 
democracy affects negatively 
stock market performance and 
economic growth. 
Greece during 1960-95 
Asteriou and Price (2001) Political instability as 
measured by an index 
comprised of terrorist 
United Kingdom during 
1961-97 
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activities, strikes, elections, 
government changes and the 
occurrence of a war exerts a 
negative effect on economic 
growth and a positive impact 
on growth uncertainty. 
Campos and Nugent 
(2002)  
 
Absence of causal effect of 
political instability on growth 
except for the group of African 
countries.   
98 developing 
countries during 1960-
1995 
Jong-A-Pin (2009)  
 
Out of 25 different indicators, 
only the instability of the 
political regime exerts a 
robustly negative effect on 
growth. 
90 countries over the 
period 1974–2003 
Campos et al. (2012) Informal political instability 
(politically motivated 
assassinations, guerilla 
warfare, strikes) exerts a 
negative long run and short run 
effect on growth. Formal 
instability (cabinet or 
constitutional changes) exerts 
an indirect adverse impact on 
growth through higher 
volatility. 
Argentina during 1896-
2000 
Aisen and Veiga (2013)  Total factor productivity is the 
main channel through which 
political unrest impacts on 
growth. 
169 countries during 
1960-2004 
Uddin et al. (2017)  
 
Political instability negatively 
affects economic growth of 
low- and middle-income 
countries.  
120 developing 
countries over the 
period of 1996–2014 
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Table 2: Incidents of political instability and growth rates of GDP per capita 
Year Event 
Previous 
year’s 
growth 
rate of 
GDP per 
capita 
Current 
year’s 
growth 
rate of 
GDP per 
capita 
Next year’s 
growth rate 
of GDP per 
capita 
1843 
Insurgency against King 
Otto 
2.13% -17.02% -3.11% 
1862 
Eviction of King Otto 
after military uprising 
6.23% 0.91% -11.25% 
1909 
Military coup against 
the government 
(successful) 
-0.51% 1.93% -0.38% 
1916 
Major conflict between 
prime minister and the 
king 
-27.32% -16.21% -13.61% 
1922 
Military coup against 
the government 
(successful) 
29.18% 2.33% 1.24% 
1923 
Military coup against 
the government 
(unsuccessful) 
2.33% 1.24% 3.42% 
1925 
Military coup against 
the government 
(successful) 
3.41% 3.94% 1.85% 
1926 
Military coup against 
the government 
(successful) 
3.94% 1.85% 1.84% 
1933 
Military coup against 
the government 
(unsuccessful) 
6.98% 4.53% 0.97% 
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1935 
Military coup against 
the government 
(unsuccessful) 
0.97% 2.53% -1.01% 
1938 
Military coup against 
the government 
(unsuccessful) 
1.20% -3.38% -1.49% 
1944 
Mass demonstrations 
in the city of Athens 
and military conflict 
between the 
communists and the 
coalition government 
-17.39% -17.32% -17.41% 
1946 Civil war -17.41% 39.10% 24.02% 
1947 Civil war 39.10% 24.02% 2.01% 
1948 Civil war 24.02% 2.01% 3.83% 
1949 Civil war 2.01% 3.83% 2.45% 
1951 
Military rebellion of a 
group of higher military 
officers 
2.44% 7.38% -0.40% 
1965-
1966 
Prolonged period of 
political instability after 
major disagreement of 
the prime minister with 
the king of Greece 
accompanied with 
large mass 
demonstrations against 
monarch. This period of 
political instability 
weakened the Greek 
political system and 
finally led to the 
imposition of 
7.53% 6.84% 4.15% 
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dictatorship after a 
military coup   in 1967 
1967 
Military coup 
(successful) and 
imposition of 
dictatorship  
5.18% 4.16% 6.17% 
1973 
Military coup after the 
student uprisings of 
November 1973 
1.10% 3.39% -4.08% 
2008 
Mass demonstrations 
in the city of Athens in 
December of 2008 after 
killing of a 15-yar old 
student by a police 
officer 
2.96% -0.60% -4.66% 
2010-
2012 
Prolonged period of 
mass demonstrations 
against inclusion of the 
country to economic 
adjustment 
programmes and 
supervision by the 
Troika (International 
Monetary Fund, 
European Commission, 
European Central Bank)   
-4.66% -7.41% -2.56% 
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Table 3: Summary statistics and frequencies of variables 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
GDP per capita 
growth (%) 
183 1.360 10.558 -51.365 52.216 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
184 8.516 0.890 7.400 10.300 
Debt (% of GDP) 103 91.155 59.942 9.690 223.500 
Inflation (%) 173 5.555 15.438 -99.885 72.578 
Population 
growth (%) 
186 0.773 0.590 -3.761 2.880 
Growth rate of 
English GDP per 
capita (%) 
186 1.275 2.952 -12.656 9.058 
Polity index 
(from-10 to 10) 
183 4.797 6.154 -8.000 10.000 
Deposits (% of 
GDP) 
154 17.995 28.523 0.000 100.200 
 Obs. 
Frequency (number of occurrences in period 1833-
2016) 
Political 
instability (0,1) 
187 25 
War (0,1) 187 14 
Default (0,1) 187 4 
Elections (0,1)   187 58 
Dictatorship 
(0,1)  
187 16 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix of variables 
 GDP 
per 
capit
a 
grow
th 
GDP 
per 
capi
ta 
(log) 
Tim
e 
tren
d 
Politica
l 
instabil
ity 
Polit
y 
inde
x 
War 
Defa
ult 
Electio
ns 
Dictators
hip 
Growth 
rate of 
English 
GDP 
per 
capita 
De
bt 
to 
GD
P 
Inflati
on 
Populat
ion 
growth 
Depos
its to 
GDP 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
1.00              
GDP per 
capita 
(log) 
0.21 1.00             
Time 
trend 
0.16 0.97 
1.0
0 
           
Political 
instability 
0.06 0.08 
0.1
3 
1.00           
Polity 
index -0.23 
-
0.42 
-
0.4
6 
-0.30 1.00          
War 
-0.59 
-
0.21 
-
0.1
6 
-0.07 0.12 1.00         
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Default 
0.10 
-
0.12 
-
0.1
0 
-0.07 0.12 -0.05 1.00        
Elections 
0.10 
-
0.07 
-
0.0
7 
-0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00       
Dictatorsh
ip 
0.16 0.33 
0.3
3 
0.23 
-
0.94 
-0.09 -0.09 -0.21 1.00      
Growth 
rate of 
English 
GDP per 
capita 
0.14 0.24 
0.2
4 
0.13 
-
0.21 
0.00 -0.08 -0.04 0.12 1.00     
Debt to 
GDP -0.12 
-
0.76 
-
0.7
7 
-0.19 0.50 0.08 0.09 0.06 -0.35 -0.20 
1.0
0 
   
Inflation 
-0.24 0.58 
0.5
4 
-0.01 
-
0.04 
-0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.05 -0.02 
-
0.3
5 
1.00   
Populatio
n growth -0.10 
-
0.48 
-
0.4
7 
0.13 0.24 -0.03 0.19 0.06 -0.21 -0.22 
0.3
3 
-0.24 1.00  
Deposits 
to GDP 0.08 0.91 
0.8
6 
-0.08 
-
0.14 
-0.15 -0.15 -0.04 0.09 0.21 
-
0.5
6 
0.64 -0.54 1.00 
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Table 5: Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root tests  
Variable Test 
statistic 
Critical value 5% (prob.) 
Logarithms 
GDP per capita -0.288 -2.877 (0.922) 
Inflation -2.519 -2.901 (0.115) 
Debt to GDP -1.739 -2.894 (0.408) 
First differences 
GDP per capita -14.239 -2.877 (0.000) 
Inflation -8.482 -2.901 (0.000) 
Debt to GDP -6.196 -2.894 (0.000) 
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Table 6: Growth effects of political instability in Greece: 
OLS baseline estimates 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
0.933*** 
(0.268) 
0.164*** 
(0.057) 
1.256*** 
(0.431) 
1.220*** 
(0.407) 
GDP per capita 
growth (lagged once) 
-0.399* 
(0.243) 
-0.525** 
(0.260) 
 
-0.407 
(0.270) 
GDP per capita (log, 
lagged once) 
-
0.130*** 
(0.042) 
 
-
0.190*** 
(0.069) 
-
0.173*** 
(0.059) 
Time trend 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Political instability 
(lagged once) 
-
0.054*** 
(0.016) 
-
0.057*** 
(0.017) 
-
0.044*** 
(0.013) 
-
0.062*** 
(0.016) 
War (lagged once) 
-0.223 
(0.192) 
-0.222 
(0.192) 
-0.134 
(0.181) 
-0.238 
(0.200) 
Default (lagged once) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
0.015 
(0.029) 
-0.032 
(0.025) 
-0.020 
(0.028) 
Elections (lagged 
once) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
Dictatorship (lagged 
once) 
0.078 
(0.070) 
0.089* 
(0.053) 
0.169* 
(0.095) 
0.065 
(0.064) 
Debt (% of GDP, 
lagged once) 
-0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 
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(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Inflation (%, lagged 
once) 
0.020 
(0.051) 
-0.016 
(0.052) 
0.063 
(0.046) 
-0.043 
(0.139) 
Population growth 
(lagged once) 
-2.229 
(1.826) 
-2.094 
(1.776) 
-1.922 
(1.906) 
-1.392 
(1.909) 
Growth rate of 
English GDP per 
capita 
0.646** 
(0.280) 
0.657** 
(0.280) 
0.474 
(0.300) 
0.758** 
(0.300) 
Polity index (lagged 
once) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Deposits (% of GDP, 
lagged once) 
   
0.00001 
(0.0007) 
Durbin Watson stat. 1.894 1.885 2.201 1.921 
R-squared 0.337 0.287 0.264 0.357 
Observations 101 101 101 94 
                                                             † Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* denote significance  
            at 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7: Growth effects of political instability in Greece: robustness checks 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OUTLIERS 
RESTRICTED 
SET OF 
COVARIATES 
ECM 
Constant 
0.502*** 
 (0.161)† 
0.692*** 
(0.194) 
-0.0002 
(0.007) 
Error correction term   
-
1.044*** 
(0.073) 
Political instability 
(lagged difference) 
  
-
0.051*** 
(0.018) 
GDP per capita 
growth (lagged once) 
-0.053 
(0.100) 
-0.163 
(0.124) 
 
GDP per capita (log, 
lagged once) 
-0.068** 
(0.027) 
-0.097***  
(0.033) 
 
 
Time trend 
0.001** 
(0.0006) 
0.001** 
(0.0009) 
 
Political instability 
(lagged once) 
-
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
-0.047*** 
(0.013) 
 
War (lagged once)    
Default (lagged once) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
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Elections (lagged 
once) 
0.00004 
(0.009) 
  
Dictatorship (lagged 
once) 
0.049 
(0.043) 
  
Debt (% of GDP, 
lagged once) 
-
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
 
Inflation (%, lagged 
once) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
0.039 
(0.046) 
 
Population growth 
(lagged once) 
-1.599 
(1.138) 
-0.875 
(2.641) 
 
Growth rate of 
English GDP per 
capita 
0.509*** 
(0.192) 
0.377 
(0.319) 
 
Polity index (lagged 
once) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
 
R-squared 0.417 0.190  
Observations 95 101 183 
† Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at  
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 1. The dummy of war was omitted 
from the regression  
of the first column. 
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Table 8: Determinants of political instability (probit estimates) 
Dependent variable: 
Political instability 
(1) (2) 
Constant 
-1.758 
 (1.212)† 
-
4.322*** 
 (1.640) 
Political instability 
(lagged once) 
0.901*** 
(0.295) 
0.646* 
(0.355) 
GDP per capita 
growth (lagged once) 
0.956 
(1.477) 
0.445 
(1.666) 
GDP per capita (log, 
lagged once) 
0.070 
(0.142) 
0.377** 
(0.193) 
Polity (lagged once) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.067** 
(0.031) 
Default (lagged once)  
0.855 
(0.844) 
War (lagged once)  
1.048** 
(0.506) 
Elections (lagged 
once) 
 
0.043 
(0.294) 
Dictatorship (lagged 
once) 
 
-0.491 
(0.574) 
Inflation (lagged 
once) 
 
-0.170 
(0.677) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.085 0.21 
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Observations 178 168 
                                                 † Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**  
                                                  and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9: Instrumental variable estimates (three stage least squares) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
Constant 
 0.218 
(0.249)† 
-0.094 
 (0.499) 
0.222 
(0.239) 
0.455** 
(0.227) 
0.211 
(0266) 
GDP per capita growth 
(lagged once) 
0.023 
 (0.105) 
-0.041 
(0.127) 
0.001 
(0.137) 
0.023 
(0.136) 
0.011 
(0.107) 
GDP per capita (log, lagged 
once) 
-0.026 
(0.035) 
0.017 
 (0.066) 
-0.029 
(0.036) 
-0.065* 
(0.035) 
-0.025 
(0.037) 
Time trend 
 0.0006 
(0.0006) 
0.0002 
 (0.0009) 
0.0008 
(0.0007) 
0.001* 
(0.0007) 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
Political instability  
-
0.317**
* 
 (0.122) 
 -0.307* 
(0.168) 
-0.191* 
(0.107) 
 
-0.339** 
(0.137) 
War  
 -
0.280**
* 
(0.073) 
 -
0.283**
* 
(0.091) 
  
-
0.280**
* 
(0.082) 
Default 
0.011 
 (0.072) 
0.004 
 (0.091) 
  
0.008 
(0.080) 
Elections  
 0.007 
(0.026) 
0.006 
 (0.033) 
  
0.006 
(0.029) 
Dictatorship  
 0.074 
(0.046) 
0.068 
 (0.059) 
  
0.078 
(0.051) 
Principal component of 
political instability, war, 
   -0.019  
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dictatorship, default and 
election 
(0.008)*
* 
Growth rate of English GDP 
per capita 
0.097 
 (0.239) 
 0.090 
(0.236) 
0.245 
(0.333) 
0.446 
(0.336) 
 
Growth rate of English GDP 
per capita (1833-1940) 
    
0.034 
(0.342) 
Debt (% of GDP) 
-0.0001 
 (0.0001) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-
0.0003*
* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Inflation   
 -0.096 
(0.094) 
 -
0.371** 
(0.183) 
-0.082 
(0.078) 
-0.050 
(0.061) 
-0.102 
(0.104) 
Deposits (% of GDP)  
-0.0003 
 (0.0008) 
   
Root mean squared error 0.110 0.108 0.093 0.075 0.115 
Dependent variable: Political instability 
Constant 
0.009 
 (0.352) 
-0.072 
 (0.387) 
-0.217 
(0.230) 
0.228 
(0.753) 
-0.002 
(0.352) 
Political instability (lagged 
once) 
0.054 
(0.068) 
0.075 
(0.067) 
0.107 
(0.084) 
 
0.058 
(0.065) 
Principal component of 
political instability, war, 
dictatorship, default and 
election (lagged once) 
   
-0.003 
(0.088) 
 
GDP per capita growth  
-
2.414**
* 
 -
2.249**
* 
-
2.264**
* 
-
5.851**
* 
-
2.245**
* 
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 (0.254) (0.290) (0.310) (0.907) (0.243) 
GDP per capita (log)  
0.030 
 (0.037) 
 0.049 
(0.040) 
0.048 
(0.036) 
0.108 
(0.084) 
0.031 
(0.037) 
War 
-
0.668**
* 
 (0.191) 
-
0.634**
* 
 (0.196) 
  
-
0.625**
* 
(0.190) 
Dictatorship 
-0.012 
(0.224) 
 -0.118 
(0.249) 
  
-0.008 
(0.222) 
Elections 
 0.013 
(0.065) 
 0.008 
(0.069) 
  
0.010 
(0.065) 
Default 
 0.033 
(0.183) 
 0.010 
(0.186) 
  
0.026 
(0.183) 
Inflation 
-0.249 
 (0.233) 
-0.811 
 (0.374) 
-0.252 
(0.233) 
-0.290 
(0.534) 
-0.236 
(0.233) 
Polity 
-0.015 
 (0.012) 
-0.020 
 (0.014) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-
0.162**
* 
(0.017) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
Root mean squared error 0.326 0.325 0.341 0.716 0.322 
Observations 102 94 102 102 102 
     † Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 10: Structural break analysis 
Test Year of 
break 
Test 
statistic 
(supremum 
Wald test) 
P value  
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Number of 
structural 
break in the 
GDP per capita 
series 
1955 34.186 0.000 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative sign of the squared recursive residuals 
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Table 11: Estimates before and after structural breaks 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
 
(before 
structural 
break of 
1955) 
(after structural 
break of 1955) 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 
3.432*** 
(1.254)† 
0.045 
 (0.152) 
GDP per capita growth (lagged 
once) 
0.200 
 (0.175) 
0.115 
(0.095) 
GDP per capita (log, lagged 
once) 
-
0.448*** 
(0.161) 
0.013 
 (0.045) 
Time trend 
 0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.0006 
 (0.002) 
Political instability  
0.129 
 (0.136) 
 -0.088*** 
(0.017) 
War  
 -
0.214*** 
(0.056) 
 
Default 
0.082  
(0.053) 
 
Elections  
 0.030 
(0.027) 
-0.012 
 (0.008) 
Dictatorship   0.081 0.013 
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(0.060)  (0.012) 
Growth rate of English GDP 
per capita 
0.567 
 (0.483) 
 0.172 
(0.138) 
Debt (% of GDP) 
-0.0003 
 (0.0003) 
 -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
Inflation   
 -0.074 
(0.085) 
 -0.263*** 
(0.089) 
Root mean squared error 0.083 0.029 
Dependent variable: Political instability 
Constant 
-
6.017*** 
 (1.838) 
0.260 
 (1.297) 
Political instability (lagged 
once) 
-0.262* 
(0.144) 
0.103 
(0.108) 
GDP per capita growth  
0.339 
 (0.434) 
 -6.926*** 
(1.156) 
GDP per capita (log)  
0.726*** 
 (0.212) 
 0.070 
(0.153) 
War 
0.062 
 (0.182) 
 
Dictatorship 
 0.437 
(0.515) 
 -0.674 
(0.422) 
Elections 
 0.031 
(0.082) 
 -0.124 
(0.079) 
Default - 0.260*  
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(0.155) 
Inflation 
0.306 
 (0.241) 
-0.877* 
 (0.491) 
Polity 
0.027 
 (0.030) 
-0.069 
 (0.031) 
Root mean squared error 0.261 0.290 
Observations 44 57 
                            † Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%,  
                            5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
                       
 
 
Table 12: Stage of development of the Greek economy 
Time 
period 
Economic gap (GDP per 
capita of Great Britain / 
GDP per capita of Greece)   
Share (%) of  
rural population  
1833-39 1.60 79.25 
1840-49 2.03 77.13 
1850-59 2.02 74.39 
1860-69 2.11 75.37 
1870-79 2.45 74.19 
1880-89 2.25 71.11 
1890-99 2.65 69.15 
1900-09 2.60 67.39 
1910-19 3.25 64.86 
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1920-29 1.97 59.62 
1930-39 1.90 56.31 
1940-49 3.90 53.23 
1950-59 2.54 49.00 
1960-69 1.84 43.45 
1970-79 1.27 36.41 
1980-89 1.25 32.48 
1990-99 1.35 30.31 
2000-09 1.28 28.40 
2010-16 1.55 27.23 
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Table 13: Growth effect of political instability at various stages of economic development in Greece  
(economic gap with England) 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
1st quartile (low  
economic gap) 
2nd quartile (low-
medium economic 
gap) 
3rd quartile 
(medium-high 
economic gap) 
4th quartile (high 
economic gap) 
Political instability 
(lagged once) 
-
0.029** 
(0.015)† 
-
0.066** 
(0.030) 
-
0.063** 
(0.026) 
-
0.069*** 
(0.021) 
-0.044 
(0.039) 
-
0.097** 
(0.046) 
-
0.075** 
(0.036) 
0.114 
(0.146) 
0.021 
(0.118) 
Economic gap with 
England (lagged once) 
0.175** 
(0.071) 
 
0.332** 
(0.142) 
 
0.256 
(0.374) 
 
0.871** 
(0.414) 
 
-
0.739* 
(0.389) 
R-squared 0.409 0.754 0.794 0.772 0.787 0.706 0.840 0.410 0.495 
Observations 101 40 40 22 22 19 19 32 32 
        † Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
         All regressions include as controls the variables of lagged GDP per capita growth, lagged GDP per capita (log), time trend, 
growth rate of English GDP, lagged polity  
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         IV index, lagged inflation rate, lagged population growth, lagged debt to GDP and the lagged dummy variables of war, default, 
elections and dictatorship. Their coefficient  
         estimates are not reported to save space but are available upon request. 
                      
 
Table 14: Growth effect of political instability at various stages of economic development in Greece  
(share of rural population) 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
1st quartile (low 
share of rural 
population) 
2nd quartile (low-
medium share of 
rural population) 
3rd quartile 
(medium-high 
share of rural 
population) 
4th quartile (high 
share of rural 
population) 
Political instability 
(lagged once) 
-
0.043*** 
(0.016)† 
-
0.041* 
(0.025) 
-
0.044* 
(0.025) 
-0.031 
(0.022) 
-
0.033** 
(0.016) 
-
0.102* 
(0.058) 
-0.115* 
(0.068) 
-0.078 
(0.055) 
-0.079 
(0.056) 
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Agricultural 
population (lagged 
once) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
 
-
0.031** 
(0.013) 
 
0.134 
(0.212) 
 
0.001 
(0.030) 
R-squared  0.739 0.749 0.724 0.799 0.751 0.758 0.371 0.371 
Observations 101 43 43 28 28 30 30 44 44 
      † Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
       All regressions include as controls the variables of lagged GDP per capita growth, lagged GDP per capita (log), time trend, growth 
rate of English GDP, lagged polity  
       IV index, lagged inflation rate, lagged population growth, lagged debt to GDP and the lagged dummy variables of war, default, 
elections and dictatorship. Their coefficient  
       estimates are not reported to save space but are available upon request. 
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Table 15: Political instability and growth in Europe 
Outcome variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita    
 Effect of revolution 
Effect of revolution in more 
developed countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Before revolution 
(1848) 
      
Control group  0.015 0.020 0.008 0.009 0.020 0.004 
Treatment group 0.020 0.025 0.008 0.015 0.025 0.017 
Difference 
(Treatment-Control) 
0.005 
(0.008)† 
0.005 
(0.009)  
0.000 
(0.006)  
0.005 
(0.009)† 
0.005 
(0.009)  
0.013 
(0.012)  
After revolution 
(1848) 
      
Control group  0.001 0.011 0.013 -0.004 0.011 0.011 
Treatment group  -0.073 -0.061 -0.020 -0.077 -0.061 -0.067 
Difference 
(Treatment-Control) 
-
0.074** 
(0.037)  
-0.072* 
(0.040)  
-0.033 
(0.026)  
-0.073** 
(0.037)  
-0.072* 
(0.040)  
-0.077* 
(0.043)  
Difference in 
differences 
-
0.079** 
(0.038)  
-0.078* 
(0.040)  
-0.033 
(0.027)  
-0.078** 
(0.038)  
-0.078* 
(0.040)  
-0.090** 
(0.045)  
R-square 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.13 
Observations 154 145 147 154 145 40 
† Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include as explanatory covariates those 
of GDP per capita (log), inflation, population growth and the polity IV index of democracy. To 
raise the robustness of the obtained estimates, columns 2 and 5 also include two dummies 
which indicate the occurrence of an event of war or an event of economic crisis. Estimates of 
columns 3 and 6 are based on propensity score matching. 
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Table 16: Trend growth and output gap 
Dependent variable 
(Trend 
output 
per capita 
growth) 
(Output 
gap) 
Constant 
0.159*** 
(0.052)† 
0.001 
 (0.011) 
Trend GDP per capita (log, 
lagged once) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
 
Output gap (lagged once)  
0.776*** 
(0.164) 
   
Political instability  
-0.082** 
 (0.024) 
 -0.159* 
(0.087) 
War  
 0.002 
(0.012) 
 -
0.192*** 
(0.055) 
Default 
-0.00001 
(0.015) 
0.023 
(0.043) 
Elections  
 0.002 
(0.004) 
0.014 
 (0.015) 
Dictatorship  
 0.039*** 
(0.010) 
0.042 
 (0.028) 
Population growth 
0.491 
(0.360) 
 
Time trend 
 
0.0005*** 
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(0.0001) 
Growth rate of English GDP 
per capita 
0.055 
 (0.070) 
  
0.509* 
(0.295) 
Debt (% of GDP)  
0.00005 
 (0.0001) 
Root mean squared error 0.033 0.073 
Dependent variable 
(Political 
instability) 
(Political 
instability) 
Constant 
-0.095 
 (0.242) 
0.175 
 (0.126) 
Political instability (lagged 
once) 
0.136** 
(0.067) 
0.284** 
(0.105) 
Trend GDP per capita growth  
-4.971*** 
 (0.835) 
 
Trend GDP per capita (log)  
0.022 
 (0.029) 
 
Output gap  
1.272 
(0.950) 
War 
0.122 
 (0.128) 
-0.027 
(0.187) 
Dictatorship 
 0.413*** 
(0.104) 
- 0.117 
(0.245) 
Elections 
 0.020 
(0.050) 
 -0.069 
(0.069) 
Default  0.118 -0.044 
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(0.153) (0.185) 
Inflation 
0.121 
 (0.137) 
0.267 
 (0.220) 
Polity 
0.005 
 (0.004) 
-0.009 
 (0.013) 
Root mean squared error 0.331 0.313 
Observations 169 102 
                                      † Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote  significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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